Hong Kong as a financial centre of greater China by JAO, Y. C.
Lingnan University
Digital Commons @ Lingnan University
CAPS Working Paper Series
Centre for Asian Pacific Studies 亞洲太平洋研究
中心
3-1997
Hong Kong as a financial centre of greater China
Y. C. JAO
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.ln.edu.hk/capswp
Part of the Political Science Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public
Administration Commons
This Paper Series is brought to you for free and open access by the Centre for Asian Pacific Studies 亞洲太平洋研究中心 at Digital Commons @
Lingnan University. It has been accepted for inclusion in CAPS Working Paper Series by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Lingnan
University.
Recommended Citation
Jao, Y. C. (1997). Hong Kong as a financial centre of greater China (CAPS Working Paper Series No.53). Retrieved from Lingnan
University website: http://commons.ln.edu.hk/capswp/76
Working Paper Series 
Centre for Asian Pacific Studies 
No. 53 (9/97) CAPS 
HONG KONG AS A FINANCIAL 
CENTRE OF GREATER CHINA 
by 
Professor Y. C. Jao 
Faculty of Social Sciences 
Lingnan College 
Hong Kong 
香港嶺南學院
社會科學院
No. 53 (9/97) CAPS 
HONG KONG AS A FINANCIAL 
CENTRE OF GREA TER CHINA 
by 
Professor Y. C. Jao 
為 南學院圖書館
1 3 JAN 1998 
Ll NGNAN COLLEGE Ll BRARY 
Faculty of Social Sciences 
Lingnan College 
Hong Kong 
March 1997 
HONG KONG AS A FINANCIAL CENTRE 
OF GREA TER CHINA 
CAPS and CPPS Vlorking Papers are circulated to invite discussion and critical 
conunent. Opinions expressed in them are the author's and should not be taken a 
representing the opinions of the Centres or Lingnan College. These papers may be 
freely circulated but they 訂e not to be quoted \vithout the \vritten permiss ion of the 
author. Please address conunents and suggestions to the author or the serles editors 
。 Y. C. Jao 
Professor Y. C. Jao is Professor ofEconomics, School ofEconomics and 
Finance, University ofHong Kong, Hong Kong. 
Faculty of Social Sciences 
Lingnan College 
Tuen 此1un
Hong Kong 
Tel: 2616 7429-32 
Fax: 2591 0690 
HONG KONG AS A FINANCIAL CENTRE OF GREATER CHINA 
1. Introduction 
During the past three decades, Hong Kong has emeτged as one of the leading 
international financial centres (IFCs) of the world. Since China began its economic reform and 
open-door policies in 1979, and since cross-strait economic contacts began to improve in the 
m泊-1980s， Hong Kong's role has also bccome more varied and multi-faceted. The purpose of 
this paper is to evaluate Hong Kong as an IFC of Greater China (which cOlnprises Mainland 
China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau). The territory's prospects as an IFC after Íts 
retrocession to China on July 1, 1997 will also be discussed . 
II. Some Misconceptions 
We may begin by disposing of two common misconceptions aboutHong Kong as a 
financial centre. The first one, surprisingly prevalent in the West, is that Hong Kong is an 
1、位h立坦白na坦坦Lcer立旦~r"offshore banking centre". Even respected scholars commit this 
solecislTI (Dufey and Giddy, 1978; Johns, 1992). 
To understand our argument, it would be useful to quote the definitions of n offshore 
financial centre" and "offshore banking centre" by two authorities . Roberts (1994a) states 
"The term 'offshore financial centre' came into usage in the 1960s to describe a 
new phenomenon - the operations of financial centres which, though physically 
located wíthin a country, have little connection with that count句's financial 
system. ....... Offshore financial centres form a third tier in the hierarchy of 
international financial centres, perfonning a narrower and more passive range of 
financial functions than the global or the regional international financial centres 
But unfortunately the distinctions are not clear-cut; for instance) by some 
yardsticks London and Switzerland are leading offshore financial centres because 
of their pre-eminent roles in the euromarket. Another possible source of confusion 
is the inconsistency in the terminology used in the literature on the subject : in this 
context, 'offshore financial centre' and 'offshore banking' are used interchangeably 
with 'international banking centre' and 'international banking' ." 
According to J ohns (1992), 
"Offshore banking is a qualitative rather than a geographically explicit locational 
term. It can apply either to : (1) banks that have located purposely in specific 
foreign jurisdiction, not necessarily island-based, whose legislative and tax 
frameworks and regulatory authorities are less restrictive in comparison with their 
home-based operational environment~ 仗， to (2) specifically designated facilities or 
financial 'free' zones with their own separate customised legislative and tax 
regimes, available to domestic and/or foreign banks, which are exempted from all 
or specific regulatory controls and taxes on international banking activities that 
otherwise apply in the rest ofthe local economy." 
From these definitions, it is c1ear that Hong Kong is not an offshore financial centre 
The Hong Kong Government has never set up an 0宜shore centre or free zone with special 
regulatory or tax concessions, and which is completely insulated from the domestic economy. 
ln fact , the authorities do not even distinguish between residents and non-resident, or 
domestic and foreign currency financial activities, on a substantive legal or administrative 
basis. Hewson (1982) recognizes this when, in an exhaustive study of offshore banking, he 
acknowledges that "Hong Kong is not really an offshore centre in the sense that we have 
developed that term" even though "there are important offshore activities conducted in Hong 
Kong" (p .425). ln other words, onshore and offshore activities are completely fused together 
in Hong Kong without any artificial barriers between them. 
The other misconception is that Hong Kong is the third largest lFC of the world. Not 
surprisingly, this view is largely confined to Hong Kong and China, though some foreign 
observers also subscribe to it. 1 The exact basis for this ranking has never been c1early spelled 
out, though it has been vaguely suggested that the number of foreign banks and other financial 
institutions is the third largest, or the intensity of foreign bank activity is the third highest, next 
only to London and New York. 
In my book (Jao, 1997), 1 have used an extensive set of quantitative data to rank Hong 
Kong as a financial centre. Obviously the details cannot be reproduced here, but Table 1 
presents Hong Kong's rankings in Asia-Pacific and the world according to a number of 
specific criteria. 
As may be seen from the table, :tIong Kong can be regarded overall as the sec~ 
largest financial centre in the Asia-Pacific_regiQp, being behind Tokyo but an豆豆豆!可 喜lngapore.
At the global level, Hong Kong is also very strong in international banking, and can be 
regarded as the fourth largest international banking centre (IBC). But mc is not equivalent 
to IFC: when financial markets other than banking are taken into account, Hong Kong's 
world ranking become rnuch less impressive. Overall, Hong Kong's 'Ncighted world ranking 
was 6.47 in 1995 , i.e., Hong Kong was between the sixth and seventh largest IFC of the 
world.2 
III What Kind of a Financial Centre is Hong Kong? 
How do we then characterize Hong Kong as a financial centre? Financial centres may 
be c1assified according to their purpose, geographical reach, and historical development. 
From the teleological standpõlnt, Hong Koñg is a functional centre, i.e., one where financial 
activities and transactions really take place, which generate substantial income and 
employment, both direct and indirect. Despite its low tax rates and narrow tax base, Hong 
Kong is not a tax haven, and therefore is not a paper centre (or brass-plate centre) which is 
used to book transactions in order to evade taxation, and whìch generates little or no income 
or employment. Hong Kong is also an integrated centre, where onshore and offshore markets 
are completely integrated, as opposed to an segregated centre, where onshore and offshore 
markets are clearly demarcated. (In other words, once a financial institution is admitted into 
Hong Kong, it can engage freely in any financial transaction or activity, whether onshore or 
offshore, whether with residents or non-residents, or whether denominated in domestic or 
h叫n curren的吵
2 
Table 1 
Ranlcing ofHong Kong as an IFC, 1995 
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N o. of foreign banks 
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Source: Y.C. Jao, (1997) 
From the geographical perspective, IFCs can be further sub-divided into global 
financial centres (GFCs) and regional financial centres (RFCS) .3. By general agreement, there 
are only three _GFCs in the world, namely, London, New York, and Tokyo (~obe肘， 1994b) 
Hong Kong is not in the same league as the three GFCs. It is on1y a 、 RFCJ or more 
specifically, the second largest financial centre in the Asia-Pacific region. 4 
From the historical point of view, scholars have distinguished between the traditi9.旦旦l
centre, the financial entrep釘， and the offshore banking centre (Dufey and Giddy, 1978). (Jhe 
traditional centre is one which serves as a net capital .exporter to the world either by bank 
lending, 0叮rb旬ycωa叩p戶i址t阱a
O缸er悶s the services of i的t臼s f缸lnan肌l比Cl圳a叫 institutions and / 1口ma訂rkζets tωo both domestic and foreign 
resl泊dent的S入 The offi倪fsh切1昀or陀e banking c切en凶tr閃e has alrea(吋dy been explained. ( It can safely be s~id _that 
Hong KoÍ1的 role is that of the financial entrepôt) 
As Greater China is a sub-set of the Asia-Pacific region, Hong Kong can be regarded, 
by logical reasoning, as an IFC of Greater China as wel1. However, there are other more 
compelling reasons for doing so) as will be explained in the next section. Moreover, after the 
transfer of sovereignty in 1997, Hong Kong will also become China's offshore financial centre, 
for reasons that will also be explained shortly. Note however, that the term "offshore financial 
centre" is used advisedly here from China's point of view. From Hong Kong's own point of 
view, the territory remains an integrated IFC 
IV. Hong Kong as an IFC of Greater China: Some M句or Determinants 
In this section, we will explain the reasons for treating Hong Kong as an IFC of 
Greater China, apa此企om the simple logical reasoning mentioned above. 
The first factor is obviously Hong Kong's 、political neutrality. Although China always 
insists that it wiU seek reunification by peaceful means, it also steadfastly refuses to renounce 
the use of force as a means of last resort. Taiwan, on its pa此， despite the lifting of martial law 
against "communist rebellion" and liberalization of cross-straits contacts, still refuses to accept 
Beijing's "one country, two countries" model or its demand for direct economic contacts 
Hong Kong, fortunately, is not burdened by the legacy of the Chinese civil war. It is the only 
Chinese city where economic, cu1tural, or even political contacts between the two sides of the 
Taiwan Strait can, and do, take place in a normal atmosphere free from political hostility or 
interference 
Second, Hong Kong has an unrivalled record for economic freed函n. Two US think 
tanks, Heritage Foundation and the Fraser Institute, have recent1y ranked Hong Kong as the 
country (territory) with the highest degree of economic freedom (Johnson and Sheehy, 1996 ~ 
Gwartney, Lawson and Block, 1996). Both China and Taiwan, especially the former , lag very 
considerably behind Hong Kong.5 (As a concrete example in the field of banking and finance , 
it is universally agreed that the complete freedom of capital movement and the full 
convertibility of the domestic currency are the most important hallmarks of an IFC) Only 
Hong Kong satisfies this condition fully. In China, the domestic currency, Renminbi'(R孔1B)，
has been convertible for current account transactions on1y since December 1, 1996. In 
4 
Taiwan, exchange control on the current account has long been removed; however, control on 
capital account still exists for capital movement in excess of US$5 million for individuals and 
US$20 million for tìrms 
l Third, Hong Kong's record of national treatment and reciprocity is also second to 
none) TJ:t~空巨型.Lof "nationaltreatment" forms J?_~rt of '!þ_egrinciple of "non-discrimiIl'也妞
one 已f the main pillars of t伽he昀 G臼e缸n吋1
/、
As enshrined in Articles 1 and III ofGATT, the 市10St favoured nation" (孔位'N) clause requires 
that, subject to certain exceptions, imports from all sources should face identical barriers, 
while "national treatment" requires that, once through the customs, foreign goods are subject 
to no taxes or regulations more onerous than those on equivalent domestic goods (Winters, 
1990). Since then the concept has been extended to direct investment and the tìnancial sector 
A previous study (Jao, 1988, pp. 20-1) shows that Hong Kong had the best record of 
"national treatment" in the Asia Pacitìc region in 1986. Recent reports by the U.S. Treasury 
have reconfirmed this finding (US Department ofthe Treasury, 1990, 1994) 
The 1994 report contains complaints against 33 countries or regions, including China 
and Taiwan, for failing to accord full "national treatment" to foreign banks and financial 
institutions, but none against Hong Kong. It says that "U.S . institutions generally give 
authorities high marks for fairness and transparency and generally expressed the view that 
Hong Kong does not discriminate in terms of competitive opportunities. Activities are 
conducted on an equal legal and regulatory footing with both local and foreign institutions" 
(p. 267) 
A separate concept is "reciprocity", which essential1y means according foreign banks 
or other tìnancial institutions the same treatment domestic banks or other tìnancial institutions 
receive abroad. In practice, many countries interpret "reciprocity" in a negative or restrictive 
sense, or use it as a bargaining device in bilateral negotiations. Hong Kong, however, tends to 
interpret the principle in a liberal or positive sense. According to the Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority (HK此1A)， the "reciprocity" required is "avaîlability of some acceptable form of 
reciprocity to Hong Kong banks" , or in other words, absolute equality in mutual granting of 
banking licences is not required .6 This has given rise to a situation whereby Hong Kong is 
under-represented in some countries or territories which nevertheless have a large banking 
presence in Hong Kong. China and Taiwan are good examples, which w i!I be detailed in the 
next sectlOn 
刊Fou吋h， although China since 1981 has advocated the three direct contacts across the 
至tr哇j; (àirect commerci剖， navigational and postallinks, or the 旦且也旦g policy), Taiwan has so 
far adaman叫yr閃efi缸郎1站S記ed tωo li 丘 the embargoes on such contacts) Trade, investment, and financial 
flows across the strait stiIl have to be routed or arranged through Hong Kong. For example, 
while Taiwanese banks are forbidden to deal directIy with PRC-owned or controlled banks, 
their branches in Hong Kong are permitted to do business with their PRC counterpa吋s . Hong 
Kong in other words is the natural intermediary by virtue of geography, language, culture and 
other ethnic ties, between China and Taiwan, whose economic exchanges have been booming 
since the mid-eighties. Although there are signs that Taiwan may be moving closer to the 
旦旦旦時 policy， imminent lifting of the embargoes is not in sight, given the political tensions 
which have dominated cross-strait relations during 1995-96 
LF or all these reasons, Hong Kong serves as the tinancial entr咐t of Greater China) 
( China, Taiwan, and Macau, are all eager to make use of Hong Kong's freedoms and excellerÍt 
facilities to engage in activities or transactions which are either prohibited, or are unavailable, 
within their respective domestic borders.) 
V. Indicators ofHong Kong as IFC of Greater China 
In this section, we present some quantitative evidence of Hong Kong as an IFC of 
Greater China. A1though in principle the whole gamut of financial variables should be used, 
we agree with Reed (1981) that banks and banking business remain the core ofan IFC. Space 
constraint also prevents us from treating non-bank intermediaries exhaustively. 
China in 1996 had 35 banking institutions in Hong Kong's 3-tier system, namely, 18 
licensed banks (削l-service banks), 2 restricted licence banks, and 15 deposit-taking 
companies. These institutions can transact all types of banking business, whether onshore or 
offshore, or whether in local currency or foreign currency. In addition, China had equity 
interests in at least four other Hong Kong incorporated banks. 
The market shares of China-owned banks in deposits, loans and advances, and total 
assets are given in Table 2. China-owned banks as a group is now the second largest banking 
group in Hong Kong, next only to the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation 
(HSBC). Moreover, in 1994, the Bank of China became the thírd note-issuing bank in Hong 
Kong, and now shares with the two existing British note-issuing banks, the HSBC and the 
Standard Chartered, the chairmanship of the powe的11 Hong Kong Association of Banks by 
rotatIon. 
Table 2 
Market Shares of China-owned Banks in Hong Kong (end-1995) 
C ate立orv FLV-n一ρux r且一r且-u-
c-n
一
••• 
A' 
。iv­TA一
o-EA
一
Customers' deposits 
Total Loans and advances 
Total assets 
Loans for use in Hong Kong only 
28.3% 
19.5% 
23 .4% 
19.2% 
叫
%%w
叫
‘
fonup4 
口
25ω
Source: lIong Kong Monetary Authority Annual Report for 1995 
By contrast, at the end of 1994 only 12 Hong Kong banks had branches in China 
Actually, 7 of them are China-owned banks incorporated in Hong Kong. Moreover, none of 
them is allowed to engage in RMB-denominated business. 7 
6 
The same lack of reciprocity applies also to Taiwan. Taiwan's bank are late-comers to 
Hong Kong, but in the past five years, no less than four top Taiwan banks have had their 
representative offices upgraded to branches. However, so far only two Hong Kong 
incorporated bank have been allowed to establish branches in Taiwan.8 
Apart from banking institutions in the 3-tier system, in 1996 China also had 3 
representative offic郎， 18 trustee/nominee companies, 10 investment or brokerage companies, 
4 finance companies, and 13 insurance companies in Hong Kong. 9 Taiwan had about 8 
investment or brokerage companies in Hong Kong in 1994. 10 
Hong Kong's role as a financial entrepôt manifests itself also in the external c1aims and 
liabilities of Hong Kong banks vis-à-vis banks and non-bank customers in China and Taiwan, 
Table 3 gives the position with regard to China in both Hong Kong dollar and foreign 
currencles. 
As at end of 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996(Nov.) 
Note: 
Table 3 
External Liabilities And Claims of Hong Kong Banks vis-à-vis China 
(HK$ million) 
Liabilities to banks in China Claims on banks in China Liabilities to non-bank 
customers in China 
HK$ FC HK$ FC HK$ FC 
79,716 60 ,528 29,156 75 ,097 343 3,979 
74,570 76,574 32,123 80,849 920 5,591 
67,228 87,814 37,171 101 ,471 645 5,923 
99,408 126,367 47,597 129,012 1,371 6,476 
110,867 105 ,553 52,230 171 ,634 2,822 6,494 
123,651 162,844 65 ,826 221 ,605 3,008 8,624 
FC foreign currencies 
Source: Hong Kong Monetary Authority Monthly Statistical Bulletin 
Claims on non-bank 
customers in China 
HK$ FC 
1,843 45 ,640 
2,822 53,123 
2,732 53 ,561 
1,895 59,744 
2,439 62,575 
3,357 67.257 
The table shows that liabilities to and c1aims on banks and non-banks in China have 
both been increasing su咖I
Hong Kong dollars to banks in China, but net c1aiins in foreign currencies on them) (For non- 行
bank customers, Hong Kong had net liabilities to them in Hong Kong dollars, but nèt c1aims 、
on them in foreign currencies .) 坦竺些竺些竺竺哩"Ho旦巨型g banks" inc1udes actually many 
China-owned or controlled b'anks based in I-!()nL~o.!:l:g. (To that e胸前， the table shows that 
China-owned banks use actively Hong Kong's facilities 、 to transact business which wou的
o伽
7 
(Hong Kong is a leading syndication centre of 伽 world， given 伽 of伽 top 100 
b祕s of伽 w州 some 85 h抑制的日蚓出eir presence in Hong Ko吵
As there are also a large number of Chinese banks in Hong Kong, the territory is 
therefore the natural centre for arranging bank loans to China. According to Chen Yuan, the 
Executive Deputy Governor of the People's Bank of China，可0% of syndicated loans for use 
in mainland China are arranged in Hong Kong" (Chen, 1996). 
(Ho時 Kong is not ju圳 banking centre, but also _ a呻tal=-rai叫centre， for Chi~a) Q3Y 
the end of 1995, 17 Chinese state-owned enterprises (the so-called H-shares) had been lisÚ~d 
on the Stock Ex~hange of Hong Kong (SEHK), raising more than HK$20 billion (about 
US$2.6 billion).l j In _adql!i9nJ here were_39 _ "~~g ~_~~ 些~h~ _end of 122豆，此-，- HQngKong
listed companies in which China_had _acquired controlling interests (L泊， 1995). Moreover, 
"over 40% of the companies listed in Hong Kong have participated in almost one thousand 
investment projects in mainland China, with a total investment of about HK$500 billion (about 
US$64.6 billion). The total market value of Chinese enterprises listed on the Hong Kong 
stock market is almost HK$100 billion (about US$12 .9 billion)" (Chen, 1996). 
Hong Kong's banking transactions with Taiwan are not as large as t~ose with China, 
but as shown in Table 4, they have also been growing steadily since 199 1. lQ-enerally, Hong 
Kong had net claims in both Hong Kong dollar and foreign currencies on banks in Taiwan, but 
f had net liabilities in both Hong Kong dollar and foreign currencies to non-banks in Taiwa 
This shows that Taiwan banks borrowed heavily from the inter-bank market in Hong Kong, 
but Taiwan's individuals and firms held net credit b伽ces in the Hong Kong banking 酬emJ
Taiwan has so far no companies listed on the SEHK. 
Table 4 
External Liabilities and Claims ofHong Kong Banks vis-à-vis Taiwan 
(HK$ million) 
Liabilities to Claims on banks Liabilities to non-b剖11< Claims on non-bank 
banks in Taiwan in Taiwan customers in Taiwan customers in Taiwan 
As at end of HK$ FC HK$ FC HK$ FC HK$ FC 
1991 231 11 ,179 615 40,676 626 9,877 71 3,650 
1992 231 5,501 813 45 ,403 1,041 10,916 119 4,288 
1993 348 6,161 1,092 52,302 1,353 12,584 837 4,961 
1994 562 5,983 1,327 58,999 1,676 16,078 598 5,433 
1995 570 7,861 1,179 45 ,283 2,010 18,873 193 8,536 
1996 564 15,604 1,346 37,977 2,685 19,789 315 8,465 
Note: FC foreign currencies 
Source: Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
8 
Hong Kong is also playing the role of a mentor for China's f1edgeling stock markets --
both the reopened Shanghai market and the brand-new Shenzhen market ‘ It is well known 
that the regulations, organization, and listing rules etc. of these two markets are largely 
modelled after that of SEI召ζHong Kong accounting firms also regularly advise Chinese 
state-owned enterprises to bring their accounting practices up to international standards 
(Cheung, Yeung and Yeung, 1992; Hu, 1993; and Ayling and Jia啥， 1994). Lln 1993 , the 
Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), the regulatory body of the securities industry in 
Hong Kong, signed a menlorandum agreement with Îts counterpart in China for mutual 
cooperation and exchange of information and personne1. A similar agreement \;vas also signed 
b川e SFC with its 1仰an cour叫仙n 1995) 
An IFC does not however exist in a vacuum to be viable. an IFC must be 
complemented or supplemented by other roles Thus，但!J.l2.鎧迎 with its rise as an IFC , Hong 
Kong has also emerged as a major regional business centre, the most obvious evidence of 
which is the fact that hundreds of multinational corporations use Hong Kong as their regional 
headquarters. According to the Hong Kong Government Industry Departmen 
"regional headquarters" is defined as "an organization which has control over the operations 
of one or more other offices or subsidiaries in the region without the need to make frequent 
r的叫s to, or consu1t with, the overseas parent company or h叫quarters") Tables 5 and 6 
present the number of such companies by source countrγduring 1990-96, and their 
geographical jurisdictions 
Table 5 
Hong Kong as RegionaJ Headquarters by Source Country of Ultimate Parent Companies 
Source Countr立 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
USA 252 258 206 182 178 198 188 
Japan 20 44 74 88 91 116 122 
UK 77 75 73 81 91 94 90 
China 67 62 71 85 
Germany 13 30 28 26 35 33 40 
Francc 29 25 25 21 26 22 26 
Netherlands 31 31 24 26 22 28 30 
Switzerland 34 31 33 25 34 23 27 
Taiwan 14 22 25 
Bermuda 17 16 
South Korea 16 
Canada 10 14 
Australia 11 9 9 14 
Italy 14 11 10 
Sweden 16 14 11 13 16 
Denmark 14 8 
Liberia 8 
Others 70 70 96 88 137 147 148 
581 606 596 629 717 793 829 
Source: Industry Department, Report 0n且已旦旦近旦姐姐坐坐缸里sentation 垃Overseas Companies in 
E旦旦旦豆豆旦g， various years 
9 
Table 6 
Area of Responsibility of Regional Headquarters (1996) 
Area responsible N o. of companies 
-
(a) Hong Kong and China 314 
(38.5%) 
(b) South East Asia (excluding China) 45 
(5 .5%) 
(c) South East Asia (including China) 172 
(2 1. 1%) 
(d) East Asia 94 
(1 1.5%) 
(e) Asia Pacific 191 
(23 .4%) 
Total 816 
(l 000/0) 
L一一 一
Coverages: South East Asia (exc1uding China) refers to Hong Kong, Taiwan, the Philippines, 
Notes : 
Source: 
Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam; 
East Asia refers to South East Asia (including China) plus Japan and Korea; 
Asia Pacific refers to East Asia plus Australia and New Zealand 
1. Percentages in brackets indicate the share of the total number of regional 
headquarters. 
2. Figures may not add up to the total due to rounding 
Industry Department，旦哩旦此 on the 1996 SuI主旦旦旦f Regional Representation by 
Overseas COIn旦旦IlÎes in Hong Kong 
10 
Several fea伽b切切前伽t
mul扯tinatiωona叫1 firms using Hong Kong as regional headquarters can be regarded as a mirror 
imag~ of the concentration of multinational banks and other financial institutions in Hong 
Kong) ~n吋ldeed ， the 1996 survey also shows that 129 firms , or 15.8% of the total, are in the 
白h倒el凶d也ωs'叫l
multinational companies followed a fà缸irl吋 y consistent uptrend f企t切om 581 to 829.) To be sure, 
there have been changes in the source countries. (Thus, US representation fel( by 25% from 
252 to 188, but the US remained the largest source country.) Úapan's representation rose 
dramatically by more than six-fold to 122.) Sl叩叫19ly， (已espite the i訂lpendi~已 transfer of 
sovereignty, the UK's representation also ificreased from 77 to 90, or by 17%. Ä.Third, since 
1993 , multinational corporations 企om China and Taiwan have also appeared .... on the scene) 
(Fou口h， Greater China was the focus of the geographical responsibility汗。 be more precise, 
every multinational corporation had at !e<!st two members of Greater China (Hong Kong being 
the host) within its regional purview) lIn short, the data presented above provide a solid 
evidence that 、Hong Kong is both the international financial centre and business centre of 
Greater China. I 
VI. Hong Kong's Prospects After 1997 
As the date of reunification draws nearer, speculations about Hong Kong's future have 
also intensified. Understandably, there are diverse views, some of them diametrically opposed, 
about Hong Kong's prospects in the post-colonial era. 
~ As far as Hong Kong's role as an IFC of Greater China is concerned, my own view is 
that it depends on the validity of the following six major premises ) that there will be a smooth 
transition for Hong Kong from a British Crown Colony to a Special Administrative Region 
(SAR) of the People's Republic of China;)that China will strictly observe its commitments and 
obligations under the 1984 Joint Declaration and the 199,9 Basic Law, and allow Hong Kong 
to enjoy a high degree of autonomy without interference~1hat China will continue t.2 pursue its 
market-oriented economic reform and open-door policies c;m a permanent basis;ιtihat cross-
strait relations will not degenerate into military conf1ict;\ 51hat China will maintaiQ stable 
external relations with the major industrial powers, particularly the United States;~ánd that 
Hong Kong will preserve all the favourable internal factors responsible for its past success 
(such as the rule of law, good and efficient government, business-friendly tax regime, 
transparent regulatory framework , use of English etc., quite apa此 from the comparative 
advantages alr 叫 mentioned in 吋Sec枷圳臼叫叫tion圳O∞IV
My considered opinion is t由ha羽t these six premises, on the whole, will probably hold, 
though not in the ideal manner as one would hope. Moreover, of the six premises, Hong 
Kong can control the last one only. China is involved in all the rest. China therefore bears a 
heavy responsibility for the well-being of Hong Kong after 1997, including its role as an IFC, 
which China professes to take very seriously. 
The fourth premise, about the relations between China and Taiwan, is likely to be the 
most troublesome. Unfortunately, Hong Kong has no influence whatsoever over it. The 
territory can only pray that the three parties involved in the triangle, China, Taiwan, and the 
United States, will all exercise the utmost restraint in order to avoid a war the consequences of 
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which are too horrible even to contemplate. China has its legitimate concerns about what it 
considers as Taiwan's separatist tendencies. But it must realize that the best way to achieve 
reunitication is by peaceful dialogue and "demonstration effect" of its impressive economic 
development. The tactic of intimidation which China employed during Taiwan's recent 
presidential election had not only proved utterly futile, but had alienated world opinion and 
damaged its own image. Taiwan, for its pa討， should realize that any independance movement 
is not only against the wishes of the Chinese people all over the world, but is also against its 
own interests. Taiwan should also abandon its provocative attempt to rejoin the UN, from 
which it voluntarily withdrew in 1971. If it is so keen to rejoin 祉， it should negotiate with 
China for a mutual1y acceptable formula (e.g., the "Olympic model") of representation. Last 
but not least, the United States should adopt a more even-handed approach towards China and 
Taiwan, and be wary of the powerful pro-Taiwan and pro-independance lobby, whose 
demands, to say the least, do not coincide with the interests ofthe United States. 12 
Even when the six major premises generally are valid, Hong Kong still has to face 
growing competition 企om other tinancial centres, both established and emerging. 
Unfortunately, space does not permit a detailed discussion of this topic. Here we must be 
content with some cursory remarks on the potential challenges from Shanghai, Taipei and 
Singapore.13 
Our analysis in Section IV already implies that Shanghai and Taipei cannot play the 
role of IFCs of Greater China because of political hostility and relatively poor records of 
economic 仕的dom， national treatment and reciprocity. Before W orld War 11, Shanghai was 
the premier financial centre of the Far East, surpassing even Tokyo. The Sino-Japanese War 
(1937-45) and the subsequent civil war (1946-49) sank Shanghai's status as the leading 
regional financial centre. No less unfortunately for Shanghai, for nearly 40 years, the new 
regime pursued what in effect were policies of "financial repression": expulsion of Western 
banks and other financial institutions, wholesale nationalization of private banks and other 
intermediaries, closure of all financial markets, and a crushingly heavy fiscal burden on 
Shanghai (White, 1989). (It was not until 1990 that this "financial repression" was corrected 
by a series of measures àimed at the restoration of Shanghai's former status as a m句or
financial centre: the announcement of a new economic zone (the New Pudong Area), the 
reopening of the stock exchange in 1990, and the establishment in Shanghai of two national 
financial markets, the forex market in 1994, and the inter-bank market in 1996.) However, 40 
years of neglect and perverse policies have left their marks. 
Taipei was much more fortunate in being spared such a long period of "financial 
repression". In 1993 , Taiwan announced with considerable fanfare an ambitious plan to 
develop itself into an "Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Centre (ROC)'\The ROC concept 
comprises six elements, of which one is financial centre. However, an official feasibility study 
(Ministry of Economics, 1994) concludes that while Taiwan is ahead of Hong Kong in respect 
of science and technology, trained manpower, land supply, industrial network, and industrial 
production, it lags behind Hong Kong in respect of economic hinterland, transportation, 
telecommunications, financial services, legal system, administrative efficiency, tax incentives, 
marketing, and regional headquarters, all essential ingredients for an IFC. Another more 
recent study (Economic Development Commission, 1997) also confirms that Taipei is far 
behind Hong Kong as a financial centre, maritime centre, air transportation centre, and 
telecommunication centre 
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This is not to belittle the potential of Shanghai and Taipei. Both are already important 
domestic financial centres (DFCs). However, until they can completely remove all exchange 
controls, permit full convertibility of the domestic currencies, and adhere fully to the 
international standards of national treatment, reciprocity and regulatory transparency, neither 
can be IFC in the true sense of the word. And of course, until China and Taiwan resolve all 
their political differences, neither Shanghai nor Taipei can serve as an IFC of Greater China 
The only other financial centre that can challenge Hong Kong is Singapore. Indeed, 
the two have been keen rivals for nearly thirty years. So far Hong Kong stiU has an edge, but 
it is so slight that Singapore can surpass Hong Kong easily, particularly if the 1997 transition 
is not managed well . l1.; However, as far as Greater China is concerned, Singapore is more 
distant, both economically and geographical妙， than Hong Kong. To be sure, Singapore is the 
undisputed financial capital of Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, and it is also cu1tivating 
assiduously the Chinese Connection. The fact remains, however, that Singapore can hardly 
compete with Hong Kong, in view of the latter's many advantages, as the IFC of Greater 
China. 
VII . Conc1uding Remarks 
Hong Kong's rise as a leading IFC during the past qua討er of a century is one of the 
two outstanding economic achievements of the territory in the post WorldWar II era, the 
other being its transformation from a mere entrepôt into a modern industrial economy. As a 
financial centre, Hong Kong is now wearing several hats: the second largest IFC of the Asia-
Pacific region, the 6th or 7th largest IFC of the world, the only IFC or financial entrepôt of 
Greater China, and an offshore financial centre of China after the transfer of sovereignty in 
1997. 的
Hong Kong's future as an IFC depends crucially on China's goodwill and rational 
behaviour. Provided that the "one country, two systems" model, and its financial counterpa此，
the "one country, two currencies" model, which implies Hong Kong's financial independance, 
can be shown to work, and provided that China devotes its energy and resources to peaceful 
economic development, Hong Kong's potential could be limitless. Even at the end of 1996, 
Greater China, with a combined population of 1,23 1 million, GDP of US叭，086 billion, forex 
reserves of US$220 billion, and foreign trade of US$867 bi1lion, was already a formidable 
economic force . ln 25 years' time, China alone will probably become the largest economy of 
the world (in terms of total GDP , 110t 旦旦E 豆但也 GDP) . ln a peaceful setting of sustained 
economic growth, Hong Kong, as wel1 as Shanghai, Taip剖， and Singapore, cannot fail to 
prosper together as IFCs or DFCs. 
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Notes 
For example, a French expert writes: "Hong Kong est la troisième place financière du 
monde. Elle est de plus en plus considérée comme une a1ternative à Tokyo par les 
investisseurs étrangers d的irant s'instal1er en Asie orientale. Les banques intemationales 
y sont plus nombreuses qu'à Paris ou à Tokyo (560 banqu郎， dont 360 succursales de 
banques étrangères" (Cini, 1993 , p. 11 7). 
2. The weights 1 used were: banking, 400/0; forex market, 20%; equity and debt markets, 
25%; derivatives, 10%; and others, 5% 
3. A "region" in this context means a supra-national geographical area (say one or two 
continents), not a sub-national one. 
4. The term "Asia-Pacific region" refers to countries or territories along the western edge 
of the Pacific Ocean, inc1uding China, Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, Brunei, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand 
5. The Heritage repo討 ranks Taiwan 8th and China 121th among 140 countries. The 
Fraser report ranks Taiwan 16吭， but does not inc1ude China, among 103 countries. 
6. See Annex A "Criteria for Authorisation" , Hong Kong Monetary Authority 1994 Annual 
Repo此.
7. U nderlying data in Almanac of China's Finance and Banki眩， 1995 , pp. 677-680. 
8. See "List of Financial Institutions" , Einancial Statistics 弘10nthly， Economic Research 
Depa此me肘， The Central Bank of China, Taiwan. Note that the HSBC is no longer a 
Hong Kong incorporated bank as it changed its legal domicile to the U nited Kingdom in 
1990. 
9. Underlying data from "List ofHong Kong companies having Chinese interests", Industry 
Department, Hong Kong Government. 
10. Hong Kong Economic Journa1, Oct. 23 , 1994. 
11. Addendum to Ihe 1996-97 Bud穹的， Hong Kong Government, p. 28. 
12. The Taiwan Strait crisis began in the summer of 1995 after President Lee Teng-hui of 
Taiwan paid a "personal" visit to the United States. Originally, the Clinton 
Admínistration, mindful of China's sensibility, refused to grant a visa to Mr. Lee. 
However, Congress, in an anti-China and pro-Taiwan mood, passed overwhelmingly a 
resolution welcoming Mr. Lee. The move was especially gratuitous, since only a few 
months earlier, China's Chairman Jiang Zemin issued a conciliatory appeal to Taiwan to 
improve cross-straÌt relations. 
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13. In my book (Jao, 1997), there is a whole chapter dealing with competition from other 
自nancial centres 
~I In J ao (1997), 1 use 30 economic and financial variables to compare Hong Kong and 
Singapore as IFCs. 1 find that Hong Kong leads on 16 counts, while Singapore leads on 
10 counts, with 4 remaining variables more or less neutra1. This finding is supported by 
a respected credit rating agency, Political and Economic Risk Agency Ltd ., which 
recent1y rated Hong Kong as having the best financial system in Asia, ahead of both 
Singapore and Japan. See "Asia Financial Landscape" , in Asian Intelligenc~， May 15, 
1996. 
15. Technically，扎1acau can also be an offshore financial centre after sovereignty reverts to 
China in 1999. However, Macau is too small to be a centre. In reality, Macau is only an 
economic appendage of Hong Kong 
15 
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